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there be not money in the treasury, then the corporation should
borrow, as provided in the charter or by existing law, or they should
levy and collect such tax as to raise whatever sum is needed, and
if they can neither borrow nor raise the money by taxation to meet
their expenditures, then they should cease their expenditures until
they can thus realize according to law.
But for no purpose had the corporate authorities the right to issue
warrants on the treasury payable in city scrip, or to issue the city
scrip. Their action was illegal and contrary to law and public policy. This city scrip is about the size, and upon the same kind of
paper, and in every respect very much like national bank notes,
and was doubtless designed to circulate as currency.
The court will strictly construe municipal charters, and require
clear authority for the powers assumed to be exercised under them.
While these defendants aver that they have acted in the utmost
good faith, yet so much abuse of power, not to say corruption, has
been found in some municipalities, and such onerous and ruinous
burdens placed upon the taxpayers, that to use the language of a
distinguished author, "it is the part of true wisdom to keep the
corporate wings clipped down to the lawful standard."
Let the decree be modified as indicated in this opinion, and the
injunction be made perpetual.
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uxder a special contract, which has been wrongfully terminated by the
defendant : Ralston v. Administrator of Kohl, 30 Ohio St.
Where an item of account on which suit is brought is not proved on
the trial to the full extent claimed in the petition, but the variance between the allegations and the proof is not such as to mislead the defendant in regard to the nature and character of the claim in controversy,
such variance will not prevent a recovery, if the facts proved show a
good cause of action : Id.
AUCTION.

Personal Liability- Conditions of Sale.-In an action for the nondelivery of goods, it appeared that the defendants, who were auctioneers, issued printed catalogues headed, "Great Western Railway Comp my. Catalogue of Unclaimed Property, &c., which will be sold by
Hassrs. H. & E. (the defendants) on Tuesday, November 7th and following day. By order of the directors of the above company, &c."
The catalogue contained amongst others the following conditions:
"The lots to be cleared away in three days after the sale at the purchaser's expense, &e. If any deficiency shall arise, or from any cause
the auctioneer shall be unable to deliver any lot or portion of a lot,
thn in such ease the purchaser shall accept compensation. Upon failure
of complying with the above conditions, the money deposited in part
payment shall be forfeited. All lots unclaimed within the time aforesaid shall be re-sold by public or private sale without further notice,
and the deficiency made good by the defaulter." The plaintiff attended
th-, sale, received a catalogue, bought one of the lots and paid a deposit.
He did not fetch the goods away on Saturday (the last of the three
days for clearing) but went for them the Monday following, when he
w is told by one of the defendants that the lot had been delivered to
another person. There was evidence that the lot was seen on Saturday
m-)rning in the defendant's possession as if ready for delivery, and that
it was usual to delay the -delivery of large lots like it till the smaller lots
had been delivered. The plaintiff having been nonsuited, held, first,
that on the face of the catalogue and conditions, there was evidence
that the defendants contracted personally with the plaintiff for the
delivery of g.ods purchased by him. Secondly, that the condition s to
clearing the lot within three days was not a condition precedent to the
plaintiff's right to claim delivery: 11o61N v. Horne, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. D.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

Spe - fic Ecception- General Exception to several Propositions where
ony p crt sound.-Where exceptions are taken to a general charge of
th ccourt given to the jury, unless the party excepting points out specifi.
cally the part or proposition of the charge excepted to, or the grounds
of rhe exception, a reviewing court is not required to take notice of such
g.neral exception : P., Ft V. & C. Railway v. Probst, 30 Ohio St.
An exception, in gross, to the refusal of a court to give in charge to
the jury the whole of a series of propositions requested, will not be sust-tined when one or more of the propositions are unsound : Id.
To authorize this court to review the proceedings and judgment of i
lower court overruling a motion for a new trial on the ground that the
verdict is against the evidence, it must appear that the bill of exceptions
u ntains all the testimony given to the jury or the tria, : Id.
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A bill of exceptions showing that it contains only the substance of a
deposition offered in evidence on the trial before the jury does not comply with the rule so as to enable the reviewing court to review the case
on the evidence: Id.
See Equity.
BILLS AND NOTES.
NVote givenfor Patent Right-ndictmnent.-The Act of May 4th 1869
(66 Ohio L. 93), making it a penal offence to take a "promissory note
or other negotiable instrument," not containing the words "given for
a patent right," knowing the consideration thereof to be a patented
invention, does not include in such offence the taking of notes or instruments not negotiable: State v. Brower, 30 Ohio St.
An indictment which does not show that the note or instrument on
which it is founded was negotiable, does not show an offence under the
act, and may be met by demurrer: d.
CHARITY.

Statute of Elizabeth-ChtaritableUse-eretufty-Devise to Corporation.-The statute of 43d Elizabeth, chap. 4, was never in force in
Maryland: Ould et al. v. Washington Hospitalfor Foundlings, S. C. U.
S., Oct. Term 1877.
The validity 6f charitable endowments and the jurisdiction of courts
of equity in such cases however in this country do not depend upon that
statute : -d.
A charitable use, where neither law nor public policy forbids, may be
applied to almost anything that tends to promote the well-doing and wellbeing of social man : Id.
A perpetuity is a limitation of property which renders it inalienable
beyond the period allowed by law. That period is a life or lives in being
and twenty-one years more, with a fraction of a year added for the term
of gestation, in cases of posthumous birth: Id.
A devise to a corporation to be created by the legislature is good as
an executory devise. A distinction is taken between a devise inpresenti
to one incapable, and a devise ih futuro to an artificial being, to be
created and enabled to take: Id.
CHECK.

Payment without Endorsement by Payee-Custom of Banks.-The
rightful possession of a check, made payable to the order of a particular
person, confers no authority on the drawee to pay the same to the person
having such possession, without the genuine endorsement of the payee:
Dodge v. National .Exchange Bank, 30 Ohio St.
The duty of the drawee upon acceptance of such check, to pay the
same only upon the genuine endorsement of the payee named therein, is
not affected by a custom among bankers as to the mode of ascertaining
the identity of the person endorsing the name of the payee and receiving
payment. " If the drawee relies upon false representations as to identity,
for which neither the drawer nor payee are responsible, he makes payment to a wrong person at his peril: Id.
Where the drawee attempts to justify payment to a person not bearing
the name of the payee, upon his unauthorized endorsement of the payee's
name, on the ground that he was the person to whom the drawer intended
payment to be made, though described by a false name; all the facts in
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regard to such intention being unknown to the drawee-at the time of
payment, he can not be allowed to prove a portion of the facts occurring
at the time of drawing the check, and to insist upon excluding other
material facts occurring at the same time tending to disprove such intention: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Trial by Jury.-Art. 7 of the amendments to the Constitution of the
United States relating to trials by jury, applies only to the courts of the
United States: Pearson et al. v. -ewcdall et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1877.
Right of State to regulate Judicial Process-Corporatiot-Clarter.
-The regulation of the fBrms of administering justice by the courts is an
incident of sovereignty. The surrender of this power is never to be presumed : Cairo and Fulton Railroad 0o. v. iecit et al., S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1877.
A statute, therefore, which prescribes a mode of service of judicial
process upon a railroad company. different from that provided for in its
charter, is valid and does not impair the obligation of a contract : Id.
When, however, it clearly appears to be the intention of the legislature
to limit its power of bringing the corporation before its judicial tribunals
to the particular mode mentioned in the charter, the subsequent legislation upon that subject is invalid : Md.
CONTRACT.
Rescssion.-Where a party to a contract by his acts or default renders
the performance of the contract impossible, or if not wholly impossible
yet imposes such conditiotis upon its execution as to render its performance practically impussible, the other party to the contract may treat the
same as rescinded: Se pel v. Intern ational Life Tls. and Trust Co., 3
Norris, Pa.
CONTRACTOR. See Nregligence.
CORPORATION.

See (harity; constitutionalLaw.

Stockholtlr-Evilence of-Where the name of an individual appears
on the stock book of a corporation as a stockholder, the prima fheie presumption is that he is the owner of the stock, in a case where there is
nothing to rebut that presumption, and in an action against him as a
stockholder the burden of proving that he is not a stockholder or of rebutting that presumption is east upon the defendant: Turnball v. Pa1ys-m, Assignee, &c, S C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
Transfer of Stock-Right of Refusal of Purchase by Gonipany.The charter of a corporation providing that "no stockholder in said corporation shall have the right ti)transfer his shares therein, without first
giving ten days' notice in writing of such intention, and ten days' refusal
thereof to said corporation, at the lowest price at which he will sell to
any other person ; and if in suchecae said corporation elect to purchase
said sh-ires at said lowest price, such stockholder shall, on the price being offered to him. convey said shares to said corporation." A stockholder offered to the corporation a certain number of shares at a gross
price, and subsequently sold to a third party a smaller numuber of shares
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at a given price per share. Hdd, that the offer to the corporation did
not comply with the provisions of the charter, and that the corporation
could not be compelled to allow the transfer of the stock sold upon its
book : Sweetland v. Quidnick Co., 11 R. L
COURTS.

See Criminal Law.

CRIMIfAL LAW. See Bills and Notes.
Obscene Publicaton-Indictment- Om ission to set out words charged
as obscee.-In an indictment for the publication of an obscene book,
the fact that the book is described by its title only, without setting out
any of the words charged as obscene, is no ground for a motion to quash
the indictment or arrest the judgment. Semble, that such omission of
the words charged as obscene is not open to objection by demurrer or
otherwise: The Queen v. Bradlaugh, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. D.

Rape--Consent-Submission.-The prisoner professed to give medical and surgical advice for money. The prosecutrix, a girl of nineteen,
consulted him with respect to illness from which she was suffering. He
advised that a surgical operation should be performed, and under pretence of performing it, had carnal connection with the prosecutrix. She
submitted to what was done, not with any intention that he should have
sexual connection with her, but under the belief that he was merely
treating her medically and performing a surgical operation, that belief
being wilfully and fraudulently induced by the prisoner: Held, that
the prisoner was guilty of rape: Reg. v. Barrow,Law 1Rep. 1 C. C. 156,
questioned: The Queen v. lattery, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. D.
.Continuance of Trial after expiration of Term- Testimony of Accomplice.-In a homicide case, where the'jury has been sworn on the last
day of the term, the court may adjourn from day to day, and proceed
with the trial of the case after the expiration of the term; such continuance is within the sound discretion of the court: Carroll et a. v.
The Commonwealth, 3 Norris, Pa.
To show motive for crime, it is competent for the Commonwealth to
prove the existence of a secret criminal organization, and to show that
one division of such organization furnished men to commit murder in
compensation for a like crime by members of another division : 11.
It is not error to instruct the jury that the degree of credit to be given
by them to the evidence of an accomplice is bxclusively within their province, if such instruction is accompanied by the advice that they should
not lonvict upon such testimony without corroboration : 1d.
It is competent for the Commonwealth to corroborate the testimony
of an accomplice, as to occurrences subsequent to the crime, where they
explain the relations, conduct and motive of the prisoners, although they
do not connect them directly with the commission of the crime : 11.
This court must look at the real competency of the evidence and not
at the order of its reception, and when it is found that the evidence is
all finally competent, will not reverse because of the time or order of its
introduction : Td.
Juror-PreviousOpinion about the Cse.-A juror is competent who
has formed an opinion from what he has read, but does not think the
opinion is so~fixed and determined that he would not be governed by
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the evidence, and who feels sure it would not prejudice the prisoner or
give undue weight to the evidence against him: Curley v. Tke Comnonwealth, 3 Norris, Pa.
A juror testified on his voir dire that he had formed and expressed
an opinion, and that it was fixed and determined from what he had read,
but not such an opinion as would influence or control him in any degree
as a juror; that it would not influence him to give an undue weight to
evidence against the prisoner, and that he felt certain that he could
divest his mind of all prejudice and be controlled by the evidence.
/eid,
that he was competent, as it did not appear that his opinion was formed
upon the evidence to be given, or that he had any fixed belief of the
guilt of the prisoner : Id.
Marder-Detectivenot an Accessor.-A detective who joins a criminal
organization for the purpose of exposing it, and bringing criminals to
punishment, and honestly carries out that design, is not an accessory
before the fact, although lhe may have encouraged and cornselled parties
who were about to commit crime, if in so doing he intended that they
should be discovered and punished, and his testimony, therefore, is not
to be treated as that of an inihmous witness: (Jampbell v. The Gommonwealth, 3 Norris, Pa.
DAMAGES.

For taking Land for Right of Way-How value of Land to be computed -Iu a proceeding to condemn a right of way fbr a railroad through
a tract of land, the jury should assess the compensation due the owner
for the land to be appropriated irrespective of benefits, and also his
damages by reason of the diminished value of the remainder of the tract,
in conequence of such appropriation : Cincinnatiand Springfield Railway Co v. Executors of Lngworth, 30 Ohio St.
In ascertaining these amounts, the jury are to take into consideration
the real value of the land taken, and the diminished value to the remainder, and may for that purpose take into account, not only the purposes
to which the land is or has been applied, but any other beneficial purpose
to which it may be applied, which would affect the amount of compensation or damages: Rd.
In such proceedings before a jury to assess the compensation and damages to the owner by reason of the appropriation of a right of way for a
railroad through a tract of land, the owner may show, that prior to the
commencement of proceedings, and without any knowledge that the
land would be sought for that purpose, he had laid the same off in lots,
streets an~l alleys, for sale as town lots, and had caused a plat thereof to
be made ready for record. He may also show that the land as thus
subdivided for sale is more valuable than if sold by the acre or for other
purposes, and in that connection, an unrecorded plat or diagram showing
the manner in which the tract has been divided, and how such subdivision is affected by the appropriation, is admissible, not as a valid town
plat, but as a scheme for sale affecting the value of the property : Rd.
Whether the amount of the owner's recovery shall be ascertained by
taking the value of the property as subdivided, or its value for other
purposes, is for the jury to determine If the actual compensation and
damages can be more nearly ascertained by taking the value of the
property as subdivided, they are authorized to take such subdivision into
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account, though no legal dedication of the same as a town plat has been
made : Id.
If there has been no such binding dedication, that fiet is material as
affecting the value of the. property when considered as lots, but it does
not limit the owner to proofs of the value for other purposes : Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See Husband and Wife.

See Husband and Wife.
Trust.-The premises of a deed recited the payment of the consideratiou by W , trustee for W. & Co., a firm consisting of said W., S. and
N., and gavp, granted, bargained, sold, aliened, enfeoffed and conveyed
"unto him, the said W., trustee as aforesaid, his heirs and assigns for
ever," the realty in question. The habendum of the deed limited the
realty "to him, the said W., trustee as aforesaid, his heirs and assigns
for ever, to his and their only proper use, benefit and behoof for ever."
Held, that the legal estate to the realty vested in W. in trust, and not
in W., S. & N., .as tenants in common : .Aow y v. Bradley, 11 R. I.
DEED.

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA.
Ceec.-A check drawn by a testator payable to his wife or her order,
given to her shortly before his death, endorsed by her and paid into a
foreign bank against the amount of which she'drew: Held, a good donatio
mortiscausa,although the check was not presented for payment at the bank
on which it was drawn till after the death of the testator. Rolls v.
Pearce, Law Rep. V.-C. M., 5 Chan. Div.
Query, if the -check had been payable to bearer: Id.
DOWER. See -Legacy.
EMINENT DOMAIN.

See Damages.

EQUITY.
Defence at Law-Necessity of Affirmative Relief.-In an action at
law on a promissory note, facts which constitute mere matter of defence
and are available as such in the pending action, will not, in general,
entitle the defendant to equitable relief. Such affirmative relief will be
granted only when necessary to prevent wrong or injustice : Quebec
Ban7 of Toronto v. Weyand & Jung, 30 Ohio-St.
It is error to decree a cancellation of such note, for the mere purpose
of preventing an anticipated erroneous judgment by a court of concurrent jurisdiction, in which the plaintiff's action at law on tle note is
properly pending: Id.
ERROR AND APPEAL.

Jurisdidtionof Supreme Court of Uited States-Powerto re-examine
.FnalJudgmgnt only.-The court can only re-examine the final judgment in the suit, and for that purpose must look alone to the record of
that judgment as it is sent to them. If parts of the record below'are
omitted in the transcript the court may, by certiorari, have the omissions
supplied, but they cannot correct errors which actually exist in the
record as it stands in the state court. For that purpose application must
be made there, and, if necessary, upon sufficient showing the court may
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remand the case in order that the court below may proceed : Goodenough
Horseshoe Manufacturing Co. T. Rhode Island Horseshoe Co., S. C. U.
S., Oct. Term 1877.
EXECUTOR.
Liability to pay Interest-Comrnissions.-Wherean executor did not
deposit the moncy of the estate in bank, but used it as he wanted it, in
his own business: Hebl, that he was chargeable with interest on balances in his hands: Clauser'sEstate. .Huy's Appeal, 3 Norris, Pa.
Held, however, that he was not chargeable with interest on a sum
improperly paid by him as counsel fees, for which he was refused credit
in his account: 1d.
Compensation is allowed to trustees as a reward for the faithful execution of the trust: Id.
Where an executor misappropriated funds of the estate by paying a
large sum to his private counsel, in litigation which was for the benefit
of his son, the residuary legatee, and not of the estate, and by paying
another large sum on a bond upon which he was principal and his testator was surety, pretending that it was a debt of the testator's, and both
credits were struck out of his accouut: Held, that he had forfeited his
riglt to commissions; and that he should pay three-fourths of the
costs of auditing his account : Id.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT.
See United States Oourts.
Records of Sister State-Judgment coifessed.-In an action in this
state on the record of a judgment of a sister state, which is duly authenticated as required by Act of Congress of May 26th 1780, as the judgment of a court of record of such state, such judgment is entitled to
full faith and credit, if it appears that such court had jirisdiction over
the subject-matter and the person, and that it is valid and conclusive in
the courts of that state : Sipes v. Whitney and Bowen, 80 Ohio St.
By a statute of the state of Pennsylvania, the prothonotary or clerk
of a court of record is authorized and required, on application, to enter
up judgments in vacation, on warrants of attorney on notes, bonds, and
other instruments of writing, for the amount which from the faee of the
instrument appears to be due, without the agency of an attorney or
declaration filed, which judgment must be entered on the docket, with
the date and tenor of the instrument. The statute also provides that
such judgment shall have the same force and -effect as if a declaration
had been filed and judgment confessed by an attorney, or as if obtained
in open court, and in term time. In an action on a judgment entered
under the provisions of this statute, where the record of the proceedings
is entitled and made up as the record of the court at a term of such
court next after such entry, the complete record of which is duly authenticated and certified as a true copy of the judicial proceedings of
such court in the case : Held, that such judgment is entitled to full
Rith and credit in a sister state, though the transcript shows that it was
rendered upon a confession before the prothonotary in the vacation
prior to said term of court: I7.
Under this statute it is not necessary, in order to authorize the prothonotary to enter up a judgment on such warrant of attorney, that
VOL. XXVI.-26
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there be a formal appearance of an attorney to confess the same, or that
a declaration by the plaintiff be filed : Id.
If, however, an attorney authorized by the warrant of attorney executed by the defbndant does appear and confess judgment against him,
and at the same time as plaintiff's attorney files a declaration on which
such judgment is confessed, the remedy of the defendant for such irregularity, if it be one under said statute, must be sought in the court
where the judgment was rendered : td.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Memorandum in Writing-Naming Vevdor.-A contract for the sale
of land in which the vendor is not named, but is stated to be "a trustee
selling under a trust for sale," is sufficient within the Statute of Frauds:
Marsden v. Kent, Law Rep. 5 Chan. Div. (C. A.).
HUSBAND

AND WIFE.

Deed by-Defecti'e Form of.-A statute being in force providing that
"where the husband and wife, being of lawful age,.are seised of any lands,
tenements, or other real estate in the right of the wife, they shall be
authorized to convey the same by deed or other instrument in writing,
signed, sealed and delivered by them, respectively," a deed was given,
drawn as the individual deed of a married woman, throughout the pre.
mises, granting and covenanting parts down to the attestation clause,
which read, " In testimony, whereof, we have hereunto set our hands
and seals, this 11th day of April A. D. 1867." The deed was signed,
sealed and acknowledged, by both husband and wife, the wife's acknowledgment being separately taken. Held, that the deed was a nullity:
Warner v. Peck, 11 R. 1.
Joint Obligation of Married Woman and another.-Onewho signs a
note or bond with a married woman, whether as principal or surety, is
the only party bound, and his being a surety makes no difference in the
liability: Unangst v. Fitler, 84 Penn. St.
Volzntary Settlement-Fraudon Greditors.-A voluntary conveyance
of land made by a husband to his wife, through the intervention of a
trustee, will not be held void as to future creditors, on the mere ground
that the husband subsequently became insolvent: Evans v. Lewis, 30
Ohio St.
Such conveyance will be set aside at the suit of a subsequent creditor,
only on proof that it was made with intent on the part of the grantor
thereby to defraud such subsequent creditor or creditors; Id.
One having a valid cause of action, sounding in tort, against such
grantor, at the time of such conveyance, upou which an action was subsequently brought and judgment recovered, is to be regarded as a subseguent creditor: id.
On the trial of an action brought by such subsequent creditor, against
the grantor to set aside the voluntary conveyance, on the ground that it
was made with intent to defraud the plaintiff, which intent was denied
by the answer, the plaintiff having offered testimony tending to prove
such intent, it was error in the court to exclude the evidence of competent witnesses, offered by the defendant, tending to prove that a year
before the making of such conveyance, and before the cause of action
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for which plaintiff's judgment was recovered, had accrued, the grantor had
promised his wife that he would convey the land in question to her: I.
INSURANCE.

Policy of-Stiptlation in.-Policies of fire insurance are contracts
whereby the insurers undertake for a stipulated sum to indemnify the
insured against loss or damage by fire, in respect to the property covered
by the policy, during the prescribed period of time, to an auiount not
exceeding the sum specified in the written contract: Lycoming Fire
l.as. Go. v. I1aven et al, S. 0. U S., Oct. Term 1877.
A policy of insurance provided as follows: "If the interest of the insured in the property be any other than the entire, unconditional and
sole ownership of the property for the use and benefit of the insured, or
if the buildings insured stand on leased ground, it must be so represented to the company and be so expressed in the written part of the policy,
otherwise the policy shall be void." It was admitted at the trial that the
insured were the owners in fee of the land where the buildings stood at
the time of the fire. .ehl, that a failure to disclose a lease of the property did not avoid the policy: 1(l.
.datual Ompany-Failitreto ]pay Assessments.-L. took out a policy
of insurance on his life in a mutual insurance company; the policy provided that a failure to pay any assessment within forty days after notice
of the death of a member, should work a forfeiture of the policy; a rule
of the company provided that members whose policies had lapsed might
be reinstated upon presenting a certificate of good health and paying all
unpaid dues. Notices of the death of four members, and the consequent
assessments, were sent successively, at intervals, to L., but he never paid
the assessments Afterwards, notice of the death of a fifth member of
the company was sent to him; he was then on his death-bed. His
brother.in-law, not knowing that the other assessments were unpaid,
sent this assessment to the company in L.'s name, but without his authority. The secretary did not enter the money on the books, but held
it, and wrote to L. for information in regard to his unpaid assessments.
L. died two days before thii letter was written. Hearing that he was
dead, the company tendered back the money to his representatives, who
refused t-) receive it. In an action on the policy, brought by L.'s widow,
in whose favor it was written, fleld, that there was no evidence to go to
the jury t,) find a waiver of the forfeiture of the policy caused by the
failure of f, t) pay the assessments levied upon him: The MAfutual Protection Life Ins. Co. v. Lauy, 3 Norris, Pa.
JUROR.

See OrirninalLaw.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Surrender.-Plaintiffs let a house to defendant for seven years from
Lady Day 1863. Defendant entered and occupied till Michaelmas,
when he left England for America. He left the keys with an agent to
dispose of the hou.3 if he could, if not, to make the best bargain he
could with plaintiffs for the surrender of the term. The agent was
unable to find a tenant, and gave the keys in December 1868 to plaintiffs. They employed a house agent to let the house, and he put up bills
*bn the house and advertised it to let, but the house was not let till
Lady Day, 172, when a new tenant went in. In 1S70, for a short time,
some workmen of plaintiffs occupied two rooms in the he -e for the
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purpose of plaintiffs' saddlery business. Plaintiffs having sued defendant for rent from Michaelmas 1868, to Lady Day 1872, held, that there
had been no possession of the house by plaintiffs so inconsistent with the
continuance of the defendant's term as to estop plaintiffs fromalleging
the continuance of it, so as to effect a surrender of the term by opera.
tion of law : Oastler v. Henderson, Law Rep. (C. A.) 2 Q. B. D.
LEGACY.

PecuniaryBeguest in lieu of Dower-Abatement for Deficency.-A
general pecuniary bequest in lieu of dower, is not subject to abatement
.pro rata with the other pecuniary bequests in case of insufficient assets:
Potter v. Brown 11 R. 1.
Semble, that in case of an insufficient personalty the realty may be
charged by implication with the payment of debts and legacies, but in
case of such charge the executor is not obliged to enforce it in favor of
the legatees: Id.
LIBEL.
By Answer in JudicialProceedings.-An action will not lie for statements contained in an answer alleged to be libellous, if such statements
were honestly made, without malice, and if they were relevant, believed
by defendant to be true, and were made upon probable cause, and under
advice of counsel: Lanning v. Christy, 30 Ohio St.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION.

Street- Change of Grade- Damayes to Lot-owners- Evidence.Where a city, contemplating an improvement in the grade of its streets,
causes its civil engineer to make and file in his office a plan and profile
of the contemplated improvement, and also causes a notice to be published,
notifying lot-owners to file claims for damages with the city clerk, within
a limited time, Al., owning lots abutting on the streets to be graded,
seeing such notice, went to the office of the engineer to examine the
plan and profile, and to learn therefrom what was to be done in front
of his lots, but being unable to obtain the desired information therefrom,
requested the engineer to give him the desired, information, so as to
prepare a claim for damages, who then told AL.the cut in front of his
premises would not be more than two feet deep, and by reason of such
information M. filed no claim for damages : hIeld, that the statements
of the engineer, in explanation of such plan and profile, made to the lotowner, -under such circumstances, were competent to be given in evidence in an action for damages by the lot-owner against the city for
alleged injury occasioned by the improvement: City of Youngstown v.
Moore, 30 Ohio St.
,Where a public highway has been adopted by a municipal corporation as a street, and used as such without change of grade for more than
thirty years, and lot-owners upon such street have used reasonable
care, discretion and judgment in making their improvements, with a
view to future proper and reasonable change of such grade, and the
municipal authorities cause a change of grade in such street to be made,
which occasions injury to the lot-owner, and the change of grade causing
the injury could not, by ordinary care, discretion and judgment hava
been anticipated, such municipal corporation will be liable for the
injury: Id.
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NATIONAL

BANK.

See Taxation.

NEGLIGENCE.

Contracter and Sub-cotractor--Ecidcnce- Question for Jury .- The
defendants were builders and contractors who after the outside of a house
was finished had renioved.the outer hoarding and had employed a subcontractor to do the internal plastering. One of the men employed by
the sub-contractor, in walking, shook a plank which caused a tool to fill
out of a window of the house and the tool in falling injured the plaintiff
who was passing along tile highway. The jury found that the hoarding
had been properly removed, but that the injury was caused by the negligence of the defendants in not providing some other protection for the
public. .ield, that the defendants were entitled to a judgment, for
there was no evidence that the fAlling of the tool was a probable accident
which might reasonably have been foreseen, so as to make it the duty
of the defendants to provide against it, and that if it were the duty of
any one to supply protection against the consequences of the falling tool,
it was the duty of the sub contractor and not ud the defendants. Bridges
v. AVnrth London, ?lIjway Go. (Law Rep 7 H. L. 213), discussed:
Pearson v. Cox, Law Rep. (C. A) 2 C. P. D.

Crossing Railroad Track Dutty to Stop, Look and Listen.-F.
approached a railroad crosing with which he was perfectly familiar,
and with a manageable team. He drove by an open space, through
which he had an extended view of the railroad, and stopped directly
in front of a watch-house of the railroad, which intercepted his view in
the same direction. In this position he stood still for an instant, turning his head around as if looking for the train, and then whipped up
his team to cross the track, and colliding with a passing train was killed.
He wias partially deaf, but did not leave the wagon to look past the
watch-house. .iebl, that he was guilty of contributory negligence, and
the court should have instructe I the jury that no damages could be
recovered for his death: The Gentral Railroad Go. of New Jersey v.
Feller et al., 3 Norris, Pa.
The erection of the watch-house in this position was not negligence
per se, and the question whether it was negligence to be so located
should go to the jury to determine upon the circumstances : Id.
Liabiliy of Owner who lends his Property-.egligenceof Borrower.
-The owner of a horse. lent without hire, is responsible for the negligence of the borrower, and if the negligence of the latter contributed
to an accident whereby the horse was killed, the owner.eannot recover:
Forks Townshp v. King, 3 Norris, Pa. .
K. brought an action against a township to recover damages for the
death of his horse, which he had loaned to H. to use in the latter's team,
and which he alleged was killed by the unsafe condition of defendant's
road. To show that the negligence of H. contributed to the accident,
the defebdant offered to prove that H. was informed of the dangerous
condition of the road, and that he was acquainted with another and
safer road leading to the same point, which offer the court rejected.
-ield, that this evidence should have been received: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

Construction of Agreement.-Agrcement between A. and B. by which
A. agreed to build five houses for B. at actual cost, to be completed, &c.,
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and the houses and the lots whereon they were built to be sold, and the
proceeds of the sale, after deducting the cost of the houses and tile
value of the land rated at five cents a foot and other expenses, to be
divided between A. and B. Held, that if this agreement could be construed as a partnership at all, it was one for disposing of the houses and
land, not for building them: Bisbee v. Taft, 11 R. 1.
Execution against.-The interest of all the partners in the partnership
property may be sold under an execution upon a judgment confessed
by a single partner, in the firm name and for a firm debt: Ross v.
llowel, 3 Norris, Pa.
POWER."

Extent of.-A testatrix bequeathed a fund to her daughter for life,
and after her death to and amongst the other children of the testatrix,
or their issue, in such parts, shares and proportions, manner and form,
as her said daughter should by deed or will appoint. Held, that the
daughter's power was exclusive and not distributive merely : In re Veal's
Trusts, Law Rep. (0. A.) 5 Chan. Div.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS.

Navigable River-Mooring Vessel to WT arf-Injunction.-A navigable river is a public highway, navigable by the public in a reasonable
manner and for a reasonable purpose. Accordingly a riparian owner
has a right to moor a vessel of ordinary size alongside his wharf for the
purpose of loading or unloading, at reasonable times and for a reasonable
time; and the court will restrain by injunction the owner of adjoining
premises from interfering with the access of such vessel, even though
the vessel may overlap his own premises; though such vessel would not
be allowed to interfere with the proper right of access to the neighboring
premises if used as a wharf, nor to the free entrance to or exit from iueh
premises, if used as a dock by other vessels : Original .larthlool Gollieries Co. v. Gibb, Law Rep. M. R., 5 Chan. Div.
SHIPPING.

Liability of Shpowners and Stipulators.-Shipownersare in no case
liable for any loss, damage or injury occasioned by collision beyond the
amount of their interest in the colliding ship and her freight pending,
except for costs and interest by the way of damages in case of default
of payment and suit to recover the amount: SSarrow et al. v. A riy et
al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
Nor are the stipulators, either for cost 'or value, ever liable for any
default of their principal beyond the amount specified in the stipulation
which they gave, except for costs and interest by the way of damages in
case of their own default to make paymeint pursuant to the terms of the
stipulation: Id.
TAXATION.

Shares of Stock in National Bank-Act of Gongress.-The rate of
taxation upon the shares of a National Bank should be the same or not
greater than upon the moneyed capital of the individual citizen which
is liable to taxation. That is, no greater in proportion or percentage of
tax in the valuation of shares should be levied than upon other moneyed
taxable capital in the hands of the citizens: Adams & Co. et al. v. The
Slay/or: &c., of .ishlille,

S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
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The discretionary power of the legislature of the states over all these
subjects remains as it was before the Act of Congress of June 1864.
The plain intention of that statute was, to protect the corporations
formed under its authority from an unfriendly discrimination against
them of the power of state taxation. That particular persons or particular articles are relieved from taxation is not a matter to which either
class can object: Id.
TRIAL.

Of Facts by Judge without Jury-Pactice.-Wherea jury is waived
and issues of fact submitted to the court, with a request to have the
conclusions of fact found separately from the conclusions of law, a
question as to the sufficiency of the evidence upon which findings of
Iiict were made by the court, can only be raised by a bill of exceptions.
Statements as to the grounds upon which conclusions of fact were based,
can not, by being improperly incorporated into the findings of fact, be
made part of the record : Ralston v. Adm'r of Kold, 30 Ohio St.
.By Judge without Jury-Not for mere Onhzion on Law-liest be
bona fide Controversy.-A. case submitted to the court without action,
under sect. 495 of the code of civil procedure, must present an agreed
statement of facts which might be the subject of a civil action, and upon
which a judgment may be rendered as if an action were pending thereon:
.Newark, &c., Railroad Co. v. Oommissioners of Perry bo., 80 Ohio St.
The section was not intended to provide for the submission of questions
of law for the mere opinion or advice of the court, but to provide a short
and convenient mode for such adjudication of actual cases as would be a
bar to a future action for the same cause of action : .d.
Where a case is submitted under the section which merely propounds
questions of law, without an agreed statement of facts on which a judgment can be rendered, the only thing the court can properly do, is to
dismiss the case without judgment and without costs: Id.
TROVER.

Title of Assignee for benefit of Credtors.-A wagon belonging to E.
and A. was placed by them in the hands of B. for sale. , Subsequently
E and A. made an assignment for the benefit of their creditors to H.
Trover was after this brought for the wagon against B. by "E. anrl A.,
trustees for H." Held, that the assignment gave good title to H., and
that the action was improperly brought in the name of E. & A., trustees: Meyers v. Brigs, 11 R. I.
TRUST.

See Deed.

UNITED STATES COURTS.

When amendment allowed by ,Supreme lourt.-Section 1005 of the
Revised Statutes authorizes the court in its discretion, and upon such
terms as it may deem just, to allow an amendment of a writ of error
when the statement of the parties thereto is defective. The right of a
party to amend is not absolute, but it is to be granted by the court in
its discretion. Whether it should be granted in a particular case must
depend upon the attending circumstances: Pearson et al. v. Yewdall et
al., S. C. U.-S., Oct. Term 1877.
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Retord-Authentication of-It
is not absolutely necessary that the
record of a judgment should be authenticated in the mode prescribed by
the Act of Congress to render the same admissible in the courts of the
United States: the District Court of the United States, even out of the
state composing the district, is to be regarded as a domestic and not a
foreign court, and the records of such a court may be proved by the
certificate of the clerk under the seal of the court, without the certificate
of the judge, that the attestation is in due form: Turnbull v. Payson,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
Supreme Court-Jurisdiction of-Federal Question.-To give the
court jurisdiction, it is not sufficient to show that a federal question
might have arisen or been applicable to the case, unless it is further
shown, on the record, that it did arise and was applied by the state court
to the case : Hager et al. v. T27e People of the State of Calfornia,S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
VARIANcE.

See Assumpsit.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Rent- Use and Occzidtion-Admission by Demurrer.-Claim, that
by an agreement for the purchase by the plaintiffs of property belonging
to the defgndants, the purchase was to be completed on the 29th of December 1869, from which time the plaintiffs were to receive all rents and
profits and to pay interest on the purchase-money until the completion
of the purchase. That the purchase was not completed until the 13th
of March 1876, and that.the plaintiffs had duly paid the interest. That
the defendants had reuiained in possession, but had paid no rent. That
the plaintiffs claimed rent for use and occupation at the rate of 1501. per
annum as a. fair value. The defendants demurred : field, that under
the agreement a fair rent must be paid by the defendants for the time
they remained in possession, and by demurring they bad admitted 1501.
a year to be fair rent: Metrojolitan,Railway Co. v. Defries, law Rep.
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WILL.
Provision for after-born Child. -A
statute in force providing that
"whenever any child shall be born after the execution of his father's
or mother's will, without having any provision made for him in such
will, he shall have a right and interest in the estate of his father or
mother in like manner as if the father or mother had died intestate."
A testator, by his will, gave a bequest of $2000 in trust, the income to
be used for his daughter until twenty, or until married, then the trust
fund to said daughter. In case, however, of her death under twenty or
unmarried, the sum so held in trust, together with the accumulated interest thereon, was bequeathed in equal shares to her brothers and sisters then living. More than a year after the execution of the will a son
was born to the testator, for whom no provision was made in the will
except the above described contingency. Held, that the provision was
not such as was contemplated by the statute, and that the son was entitled to share in his father's estate as in case of an intestacy : Potter v.
Brown, 11 R. I.

